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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
. . - v s - '' • • 
. • • • . - • • 
• • - . . * ' • ' • 
GYPSY ALLEN CODIANNA, Case No 14248 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State 
of Utah against Gypsy Allen Codianna, defendant and appellant, 
charging him with Criminal Homicide, to-wit; Murder in the First 
Degree in violation of Title 76 Chapter 5 Section 202 (1) (d) 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended* 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
District in and for Carbon County, State of Utah, on August 6, 
1975, after a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of 
First Degree Murder; the defendant elected to have the Court 
impose the penalty, and on August 11, 1975 the Court sentenced 
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the defendant to death by shooting on October 2, 1975. 
Subsequently, on August 15, 1975 defendant filed with the 
Trial Court a Notice and Motion for New Trial alleging that 
the verdict was contrary to the evidence and that the Court 
erred in questions of law arising during the course of the 
trial and allowed an act prejudicial to the substantial rights 
of the defendant. The Motion was denied and overruled by the 
Trial Court on September 8, 19 75. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing 
the judgment rendered at the trial and hearing on sentence, and 
a ruling remanding the cause to the Trial Court for a new trial, 
or in the alternative, an Order setting aside the sentence of 
death and remanding the case to the Trial Court for the imposi-
tion of the sentence of life imprisonment, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Gypsy Allen Codianna, was charged 
in the information with one count of First Degree Murder for 
the Murder of Michael Hoggan. The trial began on August 4,1975 
in the District Court for Carbon County before Seventh District 
Judge Edward Sheya, and ended on August 11, 1975. The appellant 
was tried jointly with Irvin Paul Dunsdon and Craig Marvel who 
were charged with the same offense as appellant. 
••*' -'-.-:. — - 2 - V 
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The following evidence relative to the Appellant 
was admitted at trial. 
George Kouros and Tamara Dennis testified that 
Appellant, Marvel and Dunsdon were present at a "keg" party 
held at Tamara Dennis1 house in Price, Utah on the evening of 
April 8, 1975. (T. 493, 509) Kouras and Marvel testified that 
Appellant was drinking beer, smoking marijuana, and taking 
drugs. (T. 500, 524). Craig Marvel further testified that 
Appellant arrived in Price about four days prior to the incident 
and that Appellant never met the deceased. (T.523, 527) 
Ralph Muncy testified that he and Michael Hogan 
were awakened by a knock on the door of their residence in the 
early morning of April9, 1975. (T. 407) Hogan proceeded to the 
living room and opened the door (Tr.409) Muncy went to see 
what was happening and saw the outline of four persons, including 
Hogan, (T.411) one of whom was holding a rifle (T.412). Muncey 
observed a struggle as he went back to the bedroom (T.419) and 
shortly thereafter heard a shot (T.422) and a vehicle leave. 
(T. 423) 
Officer Norman Vuksinick testified that he received 
a radio call at 12:28 A.M. on April 9, 1975 and responded by 
proceeding to the deceased's residence. He there examined what 
appeared to be blood in the driveway and three empty .22 shell 
casings. (T.68-69) 
Trooper LeGrand Wilburg testified that he stopped 
a 1955 or f56 light green pickup truck near the "Blue Cut" on 
Highway 50-6 in the early morning hours on-April 9, 1975. (T.98, 
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99) Upon his request, Marvel, Dunsdon, and Codianna exited 
from the truck, (T. 102) He observed an enormous amount of 
blood on Dunsdon, (T.102) blood on the front of Marvel (T.103) 
but he observed no blood whatsoever upon the person of Codianna. 
(T. 129) 
Wilberg and Nordfelt testified that they proceeded 
to Crandall Canyon area after taking the defendants into custody. 
(T. 105,141) After following some tire tracks for approximately 
one-half mile (T. 191) up Crandall Canyon they came upon a 
body which was later identified as Michael Hogan. (T.Ill, 143) 
Dr. Serge Moore, the State Medical Examiner for the 
State of Utah, testified that the death of Michael Hogan was 
caused by multiple gun shot wounds to the body and manual stran-
gulation. (T. 281) He further testified that 13 projectiles 
were removed from the body of the deceased. (T.289) and over the 
objection of counsel testified that there were fifty contusions 
on the body. (T. 282) 
Richard E. Schmidt, a Special Agent with the F.B.I., 
testified that four bullets, Ex. 10, 15, 16, and 17 were fired 
by the gun found in the pickup to the exclusion of any other 
weapon.(T. 339) Dr. Moore testified that Ex. 10, 15, 16 and 17 
were removed from the body of Michael Hogan.(T. 271, 273, 277 ) 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GOING INTO SESSION WHEN 
THE DEFENDANT, GYPSY ALLEN CODIANNA, AND HIS ATTORNEY WERE 
NOT PRESENT. 
The Court went into session in chambers on August 4, 
1975. (T. 37-51) Present were the Court, Counsel for the State, 
Counsel for the defendant, Paul Dunsdon, and the Defendant, Paul 
Dunsdon. Conspicuously lacking was the presence of Appellant 
and his attorney. At that time a motion was made by Counsel for 
the State to sever the trial of Mr. Dunsdon and continue with 
the trial of defendants Codianna and Marvel. (T.38) Such a motion 
and the accompanying statements of Counsel for the State set 
forth below involved the question of guilt of Appellant, Gypsy 
Allen Codianna, and were prejudicial toward him: 
(T. 39) 
MR. BOUTWELL: "The State is quite confident in 
this case, However, the State also realizes that 
there are some unusual relationships among the 
Defendants. Mr. Dunsdon is relative a stranger 
among their midst, and even though the State feels 
that a conviction in the, perhaps Mr. Dunsdon may 
have some mitigating evidence to put on that may 
not convict him of the full charge. And the State 
feels that the life sentence, five to life sentence 
is a fair exchange for a more reinforced case." 
(T. 42) 
MR. BOUTWELL:" I think that there was a different 
degree of participation, Your Honor, and I think 
that it would come out in mitigating evidence in 
-5-
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the hearing following the conviction on a 
capital crime."... 
THE COURT:"you are saying you think at the 
second hearing this man would be shown to b e — " 
MR. BOUTWELL; "Lesser involved..." 
(T. 44) 
MR. BOUTWELL: " Your Honor, there is one point 
I would like to make which is very unusual in 
this type of situation. The point is that Mr. 
Dunsdon, I am informed, and I understand that 
there is no evidence to the contrary, never met 
the other two Defendants until that night and 
just a matter of hours, however, before the 
murder." 
It is significant to note that neither the Appellant 
nor his attorney had waived the right to be present at that 
session of Court held in chambers. In fact, neither Appellant 
nor his attorney were aware that the Court went into session in 
chambers without their presence until the receipt of the report-
ers transcript and the reading of the proceedings had at such 
hearing. Nor was any notice given that the Court was going to 
go into session. 
It has long been held that a defendant in the pro-
secution for a felony has the right to be personally present in 
Court with his attorney at all stages of the proceedings. The 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Myers 508 P.2d 41 (Utah 1973) 
stated: 
It has been said that the requirement of the pre-
sence of the defendant in Court at all states of 
the trial proceeds on the presumption that he is 
in custody and must be brought before the Court 
-6-
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by the officer who detains him* It is a right 
which belongs to every defendant. 508 P.2d at 42 
The Court went on to hold that in "non-capital" 
offenses a defendant may voluntarily waive the right to be 
present. This seems to suggest that in capital cases perhaps 
a defendant cannot even waive the right to be present. Justice 
Crockett concurring implied that the state must show that the 
defendant voluntarily waived the right to be present. 
As a consequence, the Appellant was deprived of his 
constitutional rights to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel. Such a deprivation is clearly in violation of Article I, 
Sec. 12, Constitution of Utah, which provides: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel. 
Section. 77-1-8 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
states: 
In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is 
entitled to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel. 
And at Sec.77-27-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
...if the prosecution for a felony, the 
defendant must be personally present at the 
trial. 
In State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1935) the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Where a defendant is in custody and therefore 
not a free agent, the duty is on the Court to 
see that he is personally present at every stage 
of the trial... Proceedings had in the absence 
of a defendant and without his knowledge or 
consent, is ground for reversal. 51 P.2d at 1056 
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It should be noted that Appellant throughout the 
entire course of the trial was in custody and the Court there-
fore had the duty to see that defendant was present at every 
stage of the trial. 
The Court in Aikers/ supra, further said: 
The right to be present at all stages of the trial 
is claimed to be of such an absolute character 
that it cannot be waived either by counsel or the 
defendant, and when the Court permits the trial 
to proceed in the absence of the defendant, the 
judgment of conviction must be set aside. There 
is no doubt but that the constitutional right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel is a 
sacred right of one accused of crime which may 
not be denied by a court or be waived by counsel. 
51 P.2d at 1055. 
The Courts have also held that the failure of the 
Court to have the defendant present at other critical stages of 
the trial constitutes reversible error. See Hopt v. People of 
Terr, of Utah 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 286 Ed. 262 (1894). 
United States v. Crutcher 405 F. 2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968) , Knight 
v. State 273 Ala. 480, 142 So.2d 899 ( Ala.1962), State v. 
Carver 94 Idaho 677, 496 P.2d 676 ( Ida. 1972). 
The question remains whether the failure to obtain 
the defendant's presence or at least to notify him of the 
trial proceeding was so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal• 
The Court in Carver stated: 
The.ordinary test for determining if the consti-
tutional error warrants a new trial is whether 
it is harmless or prejudicial...Furthermore the 
Court in Chapman v. United States made it clear 
that there are errors affecting fundamental 
constitutional rights "so basic to a fair trial 
-8-
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that their infraction can never be treated 
as a harmless error." 496 P.2d at 679. 
The Carver court quotes from a similar case in Michigan, People 
v. Medcoff 344 Mich. 108, 73 N.W. 2d 537 (1955). In that case 
the defendant had been excluded from the courtroom during the 
examination of the jurors concerning an alleged misconduct by 
one of the jurors. The court ordered a new trial and said that 
what happened between the judge and the jury was not itself 
prejudicial but these factors were immaterial. The Court said: 
The abrogation of defendants1 right to be present 
is not determined from the result and review there-
of of the court;s inquiry but rather from the mere 
fact that during the injury defendants were not 
given an opportunity to exercise those privileges 
which their right to be present affords them. Where 
such fundamental rights are denied, the guilt or 
innocence of the accused is not concerned and 
neither party is put to the burden of showing actual 
injury or prejudice or lack of it. Injury is con-
clusively presumed. 73 N.S. 2d at 543 
In the instant case, the Court was clearly not the 
trier of fact as to the guilt or innocence of Appellant, but the 
Court was the one the defendant chose to make the decision as to 
whether the death penalty was imposed. This made him the trier 
of fact in that regard and any information that he was allowed 
to hear should have been heard in the presence of the defendant 
and his counsel. The defendant should have been able to hear 
the accusations made by Dunsdon, Counsel and the State, and been 
given an equal opportunity to not only cross-examine him (Utah 
Code Annotated,Section 77-1-8) but also the opportunity to 
influence the judge vis-a-vis the Dunsdon testimony. The 
_g_ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
information exchanged between Dunsdon and the Court would 
have had a bearing on the choice Codianna made as to whom 
should impose the sentence and the type of testimony he would 
have given the judge at the sentencing proceeding. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANTS DEATH SENTENCE IMPOSED PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-3-206 and 207 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER 
THE HOLDING OF FURMAN v.GEORGIA AND CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
The United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 33 L.Ed. 2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972) held uncon-
stitutional all death sentences imposed pursuant to any statutory 
scheme that delegates to the judge or jury the discretion whether 
or not to impose the death penalty upon conviction. Accordingly, 
death sentences in approximately 117 other capital cases, in-
volving numerous differing death penalty statutes from 26 states, 
including Utah, were summarily vacated simultaneously with 
Furman and upon its authority. Utah's death penalty statute 
in effect at that time was among those reviewed and held uncon-
stitutional by the Court. See Kelbach v. Utah 408 U.S. 935, 
92 S.Ct. 2858. 33 L.Ed.2d 751 (1972). The Utah statute under 
review, Utah Code Annotated 76-30-4 provided: 
Every person guilty of murder in the first degree 
shall suffer death, or upon the recommendation of 
the jury may be imprisoned at hard labor in the 
State prison for life, in the discretion of the 
Court. 
An analysis of that stutute would indicate that the jury in 
determining whether to recommend life imprisonment would be 
bound by no standards and the possibility of discrimination 
and arbitrariness were unrestricted. 
-11-
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In an effort to rectify the shortcomings of the 
unconstitutional statute, the Utah Legislature repealed Utah 
Code Annotated 76-30-4 (Laws of Utah 1973, Chapter 196, Section 
76-10-1401) and enacted Utah Code Annotated 76-3-206 and 207, 
which provide for post-conviction proceedings before judge or 
jury to determine whether the sentence shall be death or life 
imprisonment in a case involving a capital felony. The statute 
attempts to proscribe the scope of evidence admissible at the 
hearing by allowing evidence 
"as to any matter the Court deems relevant to 
sentence, including but not limited to the nature 
and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's 
character, background, history, mental and physical 
condition, and any other facts in aggravation or 
mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court 
deems to have probative force may be received re-
gardless of its admissibility under the exclusion-
ary rules of evidence. Utah Code Annotated 76-3-207. 
The statute then continues to set forth circumstances 
which shall be received in mitigation by the judge or jury: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history or 
prior criminal activity; 
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant 
was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance; 
(c) The defendant acted under extreme duress or 
under the substantial domination of another person; 
(d) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirement of law was substantially impaired as a 
result of mental disease, intoxication, or influence 
of drugs; 
-12-
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(e) The youth of the defendant at the time of 
the crime; 
(f) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder 
committed by another person and his participation 
was relatively minor; 
(.g). And any other fact in mitigation of the penalty. 
Consideration of the new statute, 76-3-207, shows 
that the defect of unfettered discretion which rendered the 
former statute unconstitutional has not been cured. The new 
statute confers upon judge or jury the potential to implement 
the same arbitrariness or discriminatory application inherent 
in the former statute and which was repudiated in Furman. The 
discretion as to life or death after conviction still remains 
with the judge or jury with no specific guidelines or standards 
having been established to assist in that determination. The 
mitigating circumstances set forth in 76-^3-207 are suspect for 
vagueness; (a) significant history, (b) extreme mental or emotion-
al disturbances, (c) youth of the defendant, (g) and any other 
fact in mitigation of the penalty.(emphasis added) The statute 
makes no attempt whatsoever to instruct as to the weight to be 
given to each factor, nor does it necessarily list them in the 
order of their importance. The judge or jury can effectively 
exclude any or all and still has the discretion as to the sig-
nificance to be accorded each factor. 
The statute is further repugnant for the reason 
that the statute is worded so that evidence may be presented 
as to any matter the Court deems relevant. Thus, the discretion 
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of the judge or jury has been once again expanded. 
Since the judge or jury is not required under 
76-3-207 to give any weight to any of the mitigating factors, 
the potential to disregard them is ever present and in practi-
cality means that no discernible standard exists to distinguish 
the few cases in which death is imposed from the many in which 
it is not. 
-14-
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POINT III 
THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IMPOSED ON APPELLANT 
CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNSIHMENT WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
•••' The Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah both prohibit the infliction 
of any punsihment which is cruel and unusual. Appellant contends 
that the death penalty is cruel and unusual in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and in violation of Article I, 
Section 9, Constitution of Utah. 
Although the United States has a history of capital 
punishment the clear trend has unmistakably been toward its 
abolition. The last execution in the United States was in 1967 
and constitutes the finale of a trend which has been going down-
ward in civilized nations since 1935. (Furman, supra, Opinion of 
Mr. Justice Marshall at 345). Clearly the concept of sanctions 
to be imposed has substantially changed since the "cruel and 
unusual11 clause was drafted. Cruelty cannot be properly defined 
in terms of the excesses present when it was inserted into the 
Bill of Rights, but rather in terms of the contemporaneous 
condition of society. The United States Supreme Court in Weems 
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910) 
stated, 
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Legislation...should not, therefore, be 
necessarily confined to the form that evil 
had theretofore taken. Time works changes, 
- brings into existence new conditions and 
purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital 
must be capable of wider application than the 
mischief which gave its birth. 30 S. Ct. at 551. 
The principle was further enunciated in Trop v. 
Dulles 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 596 (1958) when 
the Supreme Court said, 
The words of the (Eighth) Amendment are not 
precise, and...their scope is not static. 
The Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of discovery that make the 
progress of a maturing society...The basic 
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
nothing less than the dignity of man. While 
the State has the power to punish, the Amendment 
stands to assure that this limit be exercised 
within the limits of civilized standards. 
356 U.S. 101 . 
That society changes its standards goes without saying as evidenc-
ed by statutes restricting form of punishment, child labor, 
slavery, treatment of the insane and cripples. Conditions which 
once constituted a part of every day life are now intolerable 
in a civilized society. Mr. Justice Marshall in Furman, supra, 
concluded after an exhaustive treatment of the history and 
purpose to be achieved by capital punishment, that the death 
penalty 
"is morally unacceptable to the people of the 
United States at this time in their history." 
408 U.S. at 360 
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and at 371: 
In rejecting capital punishment...we achieve a 
major milestone in the road up from barbarism 
and join approximately 70 other jurisdictions 
in the world which celebrate their regard for 
civilization and humanity by shunning capital 
">'•' punishment. 408 U.S. at 371 
The infrequency with which the death penalty is 
applied should by itself indicate that capital punishment offends 
contemporary standards of decency. The National Crime Commis-
sioner reported to the President that: 
"The most salient characteristic of capital 
punishment is that it is infrequently applied... 
All available data indicate that judges, juries, 
and governors are becoming increasingly reluctant 
to impose, or authorize the carrying out of a 
death sentence...In a few states in which the 
penalty exists on the statute books, there has 
not been an execution in decades. (Presidents 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice, Report (1967 (The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society p. 143) 
It is apparent that the continuous decline in the 
number of executions demonstrate that capital punishment is 
unacceptable to society today. The inherent dignity of man 
underlies our concept of society. Surely anything which under-
mines that dignity must be viewed as abhorrent to it. 
The dehumanizing psychological effects of lengthly 
imprisonment prior to execution, during which the judicial and 
administrative processes take place, must be considered in the 
cruelty of capital punishment. The United States Supreme Court 
in Weems, Supra, acknowledged that: 
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...it must have come to (the framers of the 
Eighth Amendment) that there could be exercises 
of cruelty by laws other than those which 
inflicted bodily pain or mutilation. 217 U.S. 
at 372 
And in Trop v. Dulles, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court considered 
the psychological impact of the punishment of denationalization 
to be a crucial fact in finding that the Eighth Amendment had 
been violated; 
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, 
no primitive torture. There is instead the 
total destruction of the individual's status 
in organized society. 356 U.S. at 101 
The mental torture of a condemmed man lies in the fact that 
there is no escape. It involves a punishment that has been 
prepared with premeditation and careful planning. The values 
of humanity are cheapened by the act of the State and its 
standards of decency and conscience are diminished. Capital 
punishment is therefore, cruel and unusual if measured by the 
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101. 
B. 
Capital punishment is cruel and unusual for the 
reason that it fails to reach any legitimate object of the State 
which could not be accomplished by less severe means. Mr. Justice 
Brennan in Furman, supra, stated; 
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It is a denial of human dignity for the State 
arbitrarily to subject a person to an unusually 
severe punishment that society has indicated it 
does not regard as acceptable, and that cannot 
be shown to serve any penal purpose more effec-
tively than a significantly less drastic punis-
ment. Under these principles and this test, 
death, is tody a cruel and unusual punishment. 
408 U.S. at 286 
Four of the acknowledged purposes of punishment 
are rehabilitation, retribution, isolation of the offender and 
deterrence to crime. The Supreme Court of California in People 
v. Anderson, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (1972) in address-
ing itself to these purposes states that: 
None of these purposes is shown to justify 
so onerous a penalty as death. 493.P.2d at 896 
See .Furman, supra, beginning at page 345 wherein 
Mr. Justice Marshall discusses these objectives and then con-
cludes by stating: 
"There is but one conclusion that can be drawn 
from all of this - i.e. the death penalty is 
an excessive and unnecessary punishment that 
violates the Eighth Amendment." 
There is no question but what death extinguishes 
any possibility of rehabilitation. Mr. Justice Stewart in 
Furman, supra stated: 
" The penalty of death differs in all other forms 
of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. 
It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation 
of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal 
justice, and it is unique, finally, in its absolute 
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept 
of humanity. (Stewart 306) 
Retribution or vengence in an enlightened society 
ought not to be sanctioned as the sole reason for punishment. 
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The Court in Anderson, supra said: 
f . . it is incompatible with the dignity of 
an enlightened society to attempt to justify 
the taking of life for purposes of vengence. 
493 P. 2d at 896 
Surely less drastic means are available to isolate 
the convicted criminal from society than death. Life imprison-
ment, even though distateful to the convicted, accomplishes the 
goal of isolation and protection of society and at the same time 
comports with the dignity of man. To say that isolation by 
imprisonment is too expensive is to cheapen life and ignore the 
fact that our penal institutions are partially filled with 
persons serving life sentences for less than capital crimes. 
The deterent effect of the death penalty has not 
been established as evidenced by recent studies. (1967) 
Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal 
Sanctions, 1967 Wise. L.Rev. 703, 706. And a punishment as final 
as death in all logic should not be based upon speculation as to 
superiority of the deterrent value of death as opposed to less 
severe forms of punishment. 
By way of summary, justification for the infliction 
of the death penalty cannot be supported in view of the alterna-
tive of less severe forms of punishments. It is inconsistent 
with any recognized purpose of punishment and is incompatible 
with the dignity of man. 
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POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT'S DEATH SENTENCE V7HICH IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SHOULD BE REVERSED AND UNDER AUTHORITY OF 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-3-207 (4) SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT FOR THE IMPOSITION OF THE SENTENCE OF LIFE 
IMPRISONMENT. 
Recognizing that the trend is toward the abolition 
of capital punishment, Utah Code Annotated 76-3-207 (4) provides 
that in the event that the death penalty is held to be. uncon-
stitutional by the Utah Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of 
the United States, the defendant shall be brought before the 
Court having jurisdiction and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Appellant contends that since the death penalty is unconstitu-
tional his sentence should be reversed and remanded to the 
trial court for the imposition of the sentence of life imprison-
ment. 
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POINT V 
THE VERDICT OF GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED 
THEREON. 
Appellant contends that the testimony and evidence 
produced at trial relative to his participation in the death 
of Michael Hogan are not sufficient to support a verdict of 
Murder in the First Degree. Appellant's Motion for New Trial 
based thereon was denied and overruled by the trial court. 
I n
 State v. Krummacher, 515 P.2d 412 (Or. 1973) 
the Oregon Supreme Court set forth the test to be used in 
determining whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to 
support a jury verdict of guilty; 
«**** where the evidence is entirely circum-
stantial
 r would a reasonable person, based 
upon all the evidence adduced in the case be 
warranted in finding beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the offense charged.'" 
515 P.2d at 416. 
The evidence was that appellant had never met the 
deceased and did not even know who he wasf (T . 558,523,527) 
whereas Marvell was a room mate of the deceased at one time 
(T. 528, 530) and Dunsdon stated that his intention was to 
go over there and beat Hogan up. (T. 593,596), Dunsdon further 
testified that at the party he and Marvell were the only ones 
talking about Hogan. (T. 593) Appellant might have been 
listening, but only Marvell and Dunsdon were talking about it. 
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(T. 59 3). There exists no reason for Appellant to have 
wanted to participate in the killing of Michael Hogan. He 
had no prior contact with him whatsoever and a motive for 
Appellant to participate in the killing is totally absent. 
After the three left the party they picked up a 
weapon at the Alpine Motel at the request of Marvell (T. 584) 
and proceeded to Hogan's home (T. 586). Hogan walked outside 
with Dunsdon (T. 587) and fell down when a shot was fired. 
(T. 588). The testimony does not indicate that Appellant was 
involved at all in the event at the home of the deceased. 
Dunsdon even testified that he and Marvell were the ones who 
loaded the body into the truck to the exclusion of Appellant. 
(T. 59 3) Dunsdon1s testimony indicates that all of the shots 
were fired by Marvell and that none were fired by Appellant 
(T. 590, 603) 
It appears also that the Court was concerned about 
the lack of participation of Appellant, Codianna. (T. 601) It 
appears that his participation, if any, came solely in the form 
that he had a gun. (T. 601) The Court's questioning at page 
604 is significant: 
THE COURT:"Did he say anything that indicated 
that he went along with the idea?" 
A. "No, I don't believe he did that either. 
Other than said it looked like he was moving 
around in the back of the truck, so I stopped 
and he was put up front." 
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THE COURT:"But his main purpose in going with 
you was to get his gun/" 
A. "Yes" 
It is significant that the arresting officers 
observed no blood whatsoever on Appellant at the time of his 
arrest, (T. 129, 214) whereas Marvel and Dunsdon had blood on 
themselves. (T. 102, 103) The FBI Agent did, however, testify 
that there was one small spot of blood on the inside of 
Appellant's trousers, Ex. 63, which was so small that it could 
not be typed. ( T. 332) Since the blood was so small and found 
on the inside of the trousers, it is apparent that it was not 
connected to the deceased. 
There was no evidence that Appellant intentionally 
or knowingly caused the death of the deceased. To the contrary, 
the evidence as set forth above is that the killing was per-
petrated by another who acted by himself and without Appellant 
having any fore-knowledge of what was going to happen. Applying 
the test of Krummacher, supra, the evidence adduced in the case 
would not warrant a reasonable person in finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Appellant committed murder in the first 
degree, and accordingly, the evidence is insufficient to sustain 
a verdict of guilty. 
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POINT VI 
IN THE EVENT THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THE DEATH 
PENALTY IS CONSTITUTIONAL, THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-3-206 and 207 BY NOT SENTENCING 
APPELLANT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT, AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-3-206 and 207 vests judge or 
jury with unfettered discretion to determine whether the penalty 
in a capital case shall be death or life imprisonment. The Court, 
in sentencing Appellant to death, abused its discretion by 
either disregarding the mitigating factors set forth in 76-3-207, 
or by failing to give them any appreciable weight. The mitigat-
ing factors so disregarded are as follows: 
(d) At the time of the murder, the capacity of 
the defendant to appreciate the criminality 
(wrongrulness) of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirement of law was sub-
stantially impaired as a result of mental disease, 
intoxication, or influence of drugs; 
The testimony was that Appellant had consumed con-
siderable quantities of beer, Valium, and marijuana at the party 
immediately prior to the murder (T. 500, 511, 524, 538) Appellant 
testified that the combined effect of the drugs and alcohol was 
to make him lose his memory, affect his vision, and caused him 
to take a long time to make a decision. (T. 540) Mr. Grant 
Smith who was permitted to testify by the Court as an expert 
stated that the judgmental capacity of a person who consumed 
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the amounts testified to by Appellant would be impaired. 
(T. 545} Appellant specifically recalled in response to a 
question from the Court that he couldn't see clearly ( T.571) 
and was having difficulty hearing. ( T. 572) 
(e) The youth of the defendant at the time 
of the crime; 
The testimony is that Appellant was 20 or 22 years 
of age at the time of the crime.( T. 537, 552 ) Certainly the 
young age of the Appellant should have received considerable 
weight as affecting his judgmental maturity. 
(f) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder 
committed by another person and his participation 
was relatively minor; 
As set forth in Point V of this brief the partici-
pation of Appellant in the crime was relatively minor. He 
didn't know the deceased at all, and no reason to dislike the 
deceased, and appears from all the testimony to have been only 
along for a ride. He didn't know where he was going when they 
left the party, (. T, 559) didn't do the shooting, did not load 
the deceased into the truck, gave no encouragement of the crime 
(T. 604) , and had no blood on his person. Compared to the con-
duct of Marvel and Dunsdon, the participation of Appellant was 
very minor. Appellant exercised no brutality whatsoever and 
performed no direct act which contributed to the death of Michael 
Hogan. Certainly, Appellant's participation, which consisted 
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only of being present when the crime was committed, was not 
of sufficient magnitude to warrant the imposition of the death 
penalty, 
(g). Any other fact in mitigation of the penalty. 
The background of Appellant is such that the Court . 
should have considered it as a mitigating factor as to why 
Appellant allowed himself to be placed in the circumstances 
in which he found himself. 
He was given away by his mother when he was nine 
months old and from that point on never knew any of his 
relatives. (T. 553) He was raised by 25 foster homes, seven 
boys homes, three juvenile halls, and the Job Corps. (T. 55 3) 
Although he went through the 9th grade, he only achieved a 
fourth grade reading and spelling level. (T. 554) He has been 
unable to obtain a drivers license or join the armed services 
apparently because of difficulties in showing his legal age 
and citizenship. ( T. 554) 
Such a background is certainly not conducive to 
developing the qualities which would be helpful in recognizing 
and timely extricating oneself from involvement in potentially 
unlawful activities. No claim is made that such circumstances 
should excuse antisocial behavior, but the obvious deprivations 
of Appellant are entitled to be given considerable weight in 
explaining why Appellant was present on the night of the crime. 
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It appears from the record that the trial court 
gave no weight to the above mitigating factors when in fact 
their purpose in being placed in the statute was to have them 
considered by the Court. The Court at p. 650 of the transcript 
stated that "if this is not a case warranting death...it is 
hard to imagine a case that would warrant the death penalty." 
But concomitantlyf in view of the age, background, limited 
participation of the appellant and the presence of drugs and 
alcohol, if Appellant's case is not a case warranting a lesser 
penalty it is hard to imagine a case which is. The Court 
abused its discretion by failing to give to the mitigating 
factors the weight to which they were justly entitled and which 
would have demanded imposition of life imprisonment instead of 
death. 
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POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS VOIR DIRE OF THE 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY , 
(A) INSTRUCTING THEM THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE THE 
PENALTY WHEN IN FACT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-3-206 PROVIDES 
THAT THE COURT CAN ALSO DETERMINE THE PENALTY; (B) INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURORS AS FOLLOWS: "LETS MAKE IT APPLY TO THIS CASE, 
AND SAY THESE DEFENDANTS ARE GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER". 
A. 
The court instructed the prospective jurors as 
follows: 
Then there is a hearing by the same jury that 
tried the case to determine what the punishment 
should be. Whether it sould be death or life 
imprisonment. (T. 13) 
...under the law of this state a death penalty 
can and would be imposed only if the jurors 
unanimously agree that the death sentence should 
be imposed. (T. 13) 
In other words, under present Utah law a death 
penalty can be imposed in a first degree murder 
conviction only if the jury unanimously agrees 
that that penalty shall be imposed. (T. 14) 
Utah Code Annotated 76-3-207 (1) specifically 
provides that the hearing on the sentence after a verdict of 
guilty to a capital felony has been rendered, shall be heard 
by judge or jury at the election of the defendant: 
When a defendant has been found guilty of a 
capital felony, there shall be.further pro-
ceedings before the court or jury on the issue 
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of penalty. The proceedings shall be 
conducted before the court or jury which 
found the defendant guilty, provided the 
defendant may waive hearing before the 
jury, in which event the hearing shall be 
before the court. 
By incorrectly, albeit unintentional, stating 
that the jury would absolutely be the one body to impose the 
penalty, the court was inducing those prospective jurors who 
might have had scruples against the death penalty to remove 
themselves so that they would not have to make the penalty 
choice. Had they been instructed that the defendant had the 
choice of electing the judge or jury to impose the penalty the 
make up of the jury might have been materially altered. Those 
jurors who were excused might have answered differently the 
questions propounded to them by the Court concerning their death 
penalty attitudes and biases. Admittedly, there is no evidence 
in the record to substantiate the assertion that the excused 
jurors might have responded differently, but in a capital 
case where the penalty is so irrevocable the court should 
exercise extreme caution in safeguarding the rights of the 
accused. In State y, Belwood, 27 Utah 2d 214, 494 P. 2d 519 
(Utah 1972) Justice Crockett in his concuring opinion states: 
Where the life of a human being is in hazard, 
it is incumbent as a part of human decency 
and good conscience to be extremely cautious 
in making sure that the rights of the accused 
have been safeguarded to the end that he has 
a fair trial by an impartial court and jury. 
494 P. 2d at 522 
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• B . . : • 
The court in its voir dire of the prospective 
jurors stated: 
,,.letls make it apply to this case, and say 
these defendants guilty of first degree murder. 
(T. 151 
By presupposing the guilt of the Appellant the 
court irrevocably fixed the notion in the mind of the jurors 
that they were to return a verdict of guilty, and by so doing 
substantially prejudiced Appellant's right to receive a fair 
trial* 
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POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS VOIR DIRE OF THE 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SEAT A NEW PANEL. 
As examination of the court's voir dire would 
indicate that the jurors could possibly, as stated in the 
concurring opinion of Justice Crockett, in Belwood, supra, 
"have gained the impression that in order to be qualified 
as jurors they should be of such frame of mind that if they 
found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree they 
ought to impose the death penalty," Consider the testimony 
of Mr. Christensen at T. 22 when he replaced a juror who was 
excused: 
THE COURT: And would you tell the Court 
whether your answers to those questions 
would be the same or would differ from the 
other jurors? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Mine differ. 
THE COURT: And in what respect? 
MR CHRISTENSEN: If they are found guilty by 
the evidence I believe in capital punishment. 
So I could vote. 
Attention is also called to the questioning of 
prospective juror,Lydia Palacios, who stated that she didn' t 
think that she could under any circumstances vote for capital 
punishment. Continual questioning by the court finally induced 
her to state that she couldn't vote for capital punishment, and 
as a result was excused. (T. 18) 
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Mrs. Alda Alger stated "I don't believe that I could"(T.20-21) 
The court in pursuing the line of questioning it did when both 
stated didn't believe or didn't think could not have helped 
but create in the minds of the jury the need for them to be 
death oriented. This violates the rule set forth in Belwood 
where the majority opinion stated: 
The State is not entitled to have a panel 
of jurors comprised of only those members 
of the community who are in favor of the 
death penalty in capital cases. 494 P.2d 
at 521 See also Witherspoon v. Illinois 
391 U.S. 510 (1968) 
The court also erred in failing to inquire of 
jurors who evidenced no objection to the death penalty whether 
they had an unwavering death penalty bias. A death oriented 
jury was therefore empaneled and was not representative of a 
cross section of the community. Appellant,recognizing that 
the jury was death oriented, had no logical choice but to elect 
the sentence to be imposed by the court, and whose death penalty 
bias was unknown to the Appellant. Note objections by counsel 
at pages 17, 19,21, and 28. 
Witherspoon, supra, in essence held that prospective 
jurors who could under no circumstances impose the death penalty 
could be excused by the Court. At the other end of the spectrum 
it would be more reprehensible for the Court to fail to excuse a 
prospective juror who is absolutely death oriented, i.e., would 
automatically vote to impose the death penalty upon conviction. 
The testimony of Mr. Christensen (T. 32) indicated that such was 
his position. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the Trial 
Court committed reversible error as set forth in Points I, V, 
VI, VII, and VIII, and that the death penalty is unconstitution-
al as more fully set forth in Points II, III, and IV of the 
foregoing Brief. The Judgment rendered at trial should be re-
versed and the matter remanded to the Trial Court for a new 
trial, or in the alternative, an Order should be issued setting 
aside the sentence of death and remanding the cause to the 
Trial Court for the imposition of the sentence of life imprison-
ment* 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryrfe/K. Bryner 
155 ^ So. Main 
Helper, Utah 84526 
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